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Project Citation: 

Fang, Hanming, and Gavazza, Alessandro. Replication data for: Dynamic Inefficiencies in an Employment-Based Health Insurance System: Theory and Evidence. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116101V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We investigate the effects of the institutional settings of the US health care system on individuals' life-cycle medical expenditures. Health is a form of general human capital; labor turnover and labor-market frictions prevent an employer-employee pair from capturing the entire surplus from investment in an employee's health. Thus, the pair underinvests in health during working years, thereby increasing medical expenditures during retirement. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the comparative statics predictions of our model using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Our estimates suggest significant inefficiencies in health investment in the United States. (JEL D14, D91, G22, I11, J32)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D14 Household Saving; Personal Finance
      D15 Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
      G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
      J32 Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions


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