Replication data for: Politically Connected Firms

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
ConnectedFirms.xls	application/vnd.ms-excel	64.5 KB	12/06/2019 10:47:AM
CrossCountry.xls	application/vnd.ms-excel	24.5 KB	12/06/2019 10:47:AM
EventStudy.xls	application/vnd.ms-office	36.5 KB	12/06/2019 10:47:AM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	12/06/2019 10:47:AM
Readme.pdf	application/pdf	34.4 KB	12/06/2019 10:47:AM

Project Citation:

Faccio, Mara. Replication data for: Politically Connected Firms. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2006. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-12-06. https://doi.org/10.3886/E116085V1

Project Description

Summary: Examination of firms in 47 countries shows a widespread overlap of controlling shareholders and top officers who are connected with national parliaments or governments, particularly in countries with higher levels of corruption, with barriers to foreign investment, and with more transparent systems. Connections are diminished when regulations set more limits on official behavior. Additionally, I show that the announcement of a new political connection results in a significant increase in value.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
      O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-12-06]

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DDI 2.5

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