Data and Code for: How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Martin Watzinger, LMU Munich; Thomas Fackler, Ifo Institute; Markus Nagler, FAU Erlangen-Nuremberg; Monika Schnitzer, LMU Munich
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Watzinger, Martin, Fackler, Thomas , Nagler, Markus , and Schnitzer, Monika. Data and Code for: How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2020. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2020-10-26. https://doi.org/10.3886/E115806V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This is the data used for our article "How Antitrust Enforcement Can Spur Innovation: Bell Labs and the 1956 Consent Decree".
Abstract: Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree which settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We identify the effect of the consent decree on follow-on innovations building on Bell patents by using exactly matched non-Bell patents as control group. We show that the consent decree led to a lasting increase in innovation, but only in markets outside the telecommunications sector.
Abstract: Is compulsory licensing an effective antitrust remedy to increase innovation? To answer this question, we analyze the 1956 consent decree which settled an antitrust lawsuit against Bell, a vertically integrated monopolist charged with foreclosing the telecommunications equipment market. Bell was forced to license all its existing patents royalty-free, including those not related to telecommunications. We identify the effect of the consent decree on follow-on innovations building on Bell patents by using exactly matched non-Bell patents as control group. We show that the consent decree led to a lasting increase in innovation, but only in markets outside the telecommunications sector.
Funding Sources:
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DFG German Science Foundation (CRC190);
Elite Network of Bavaria (Evidence-Based Economics);
German Academic Exchange Service
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Innovation;
Antitrust;
intellectual property;
Compulsory licensing
JEL Classification:
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K21 Antitrust Law
L40 Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
O33 Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
K21 Antitrust Law
L40 Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
O33 Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
Geographic Coverage:
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United States
Universe:
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Registered Patents at the USPTO
Data Type(s):
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administrative records data;
aggregate data
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