Data and Code for: Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Martin Boyer, HEC Montreal; Philippe De Donder, Toulouse School of Economics; Claude Denys Fluet, Université Laval; Marie-Louise Leroux, UQAM; Pierre-Carl Michaud, HEC Montreal

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
__init__.cpython-36 (Pierre-Carl Michaud's conflicted copy 2019-05-28).pyc application/octet-stream 161 bytes 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
__init__.cpython-36.pyc application/octet-stream 126 bytes 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
__init__.cpython-37.pyc application/octet-stream 132 bytes 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
asym.cpython-36 (Pierre-Carl Michaud's conflicted copy 2019-05-28).pyc application/octet-stream 8 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
asym.cpython-36.pyc application/octet-stream 10.4 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
asym.cpython-37.pyc application/octet-stream 10.4 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
costs.cpython-36.pyc application/octet-stream 3.7 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
costs.cpython-37.pyc application/octet-stream 3.6 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
demand.cpython-36.pyc application/octet-stream 2 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM
demand.cpython-37.pyc application/octet-stream 2 KB 11/05/2019 09:15:AM

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against financial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
      J14 Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
Geographic Coverage:  View help for Geographic Coverage Canada


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Published Versions

V1 [2020-07-23]

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