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Project Citation: 

Schmitt, Matt. Replication data for: Multimarket Contact in the Hospital Industry. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114707V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Hospitals in the United States increasingly belong to multihospital systems that operate in numerous geographic markets. A large literature in management and economics suggests that competition between firms may be softened as a result of multimarket contact—ie., firms competing with one another in multiple markets simultaneously. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in multimarket contact generated by out-of-market consolidation, I find that increases in multimarket contact over the 2000–2010 period led to higher hospital prices. These results suggest that continued hospital consolidation may produce higher prices even if that consolidation only minimally affects within-market concentration.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
      G38 Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
      K21 Antitrust Law
      L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices


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