Replication data for: The Economics of Rights: Does the Right to Counsel Increase Crime?

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Itai Ater; Yehonatan Givati; Oren Rigbi

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POL2016-0027_data			10/13/2019 05:24:AM
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Project Citation:

Ater, Itai, Givati, Yehonatan, and Rigbi, Oren. Replication data for: The Economics of Rights: Does the Right to Counsel Increase Crime? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114680V1

Project Description

Summary: We examine the broad consequences of the right to counsel by exploiting a legal reform in Israel that extended the right to publicly provided legal counsel to suspects in arrest proceedings. Using the staggered regional rollout of the reform, we find that the reform reduced arrest duration and the likelihood of arrestees being charged. We also find that the reform reduced the number of arrests made by the police. Lastly, we find that the reform increased crime. These findings indicate that the right to counsel improves suspects' situation, but discourages the police from making arrests, which results in higher crime.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      K10 Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
      K41 Litigation Process
      K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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V1 [2019-10-13]

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