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Project Citation: 

Diamond, Rebecca. Replication data for: Housing Supply Elasticity and Rent Extraction by State and Local Governments. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114657V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Governments may extract rent from private citizens by inflating taxes and spending on projects benefiting special interests. Using a spatial equilibrium model, I show that less elastic housing supplies increase governments' abilities to extract rents. Inelastic housing supply, driven by exogenous variation in local topography, raises local governments' tax revenues and causes citizens to combat rent seeking by enacting laws limiting the power of elected officials. I find that public sector workers, one of the largest government special interests, capture a share of these rents through increased compensation when collective bargaining is legal or through corruption when collective bargaining is outlawed.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
      H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures
      J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
      J52 Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
      R31 Housing Supply and Markets
      R51 Finance in Urban and Rural Economies


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