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Project Citation: 

Bown, Chad P., and Reynolds, Kara M. Replication data for: Trade Agreements and Enforcement: Evidence from WTO Dispute Settlement. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114640V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper examines implications of the terms-of-trade theory for the determinants of outcomes arising under the enforcement provisions of international agreements. Like original trade agreement negotiations, formal trade dispute negotiations are modeled as potentially addressing the terms-of-trade externality problem that governments implement import protection above the globally efficient level so as to shift some of the policy's costs onto trading partners. The approach first extends the Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2011) model from trade agreement accession negotiations to the setting of enforcement negotiations, and the resulting theory guides the empirical assessment on trade volume outcomes from WTO disputes over 1995-2009.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
      F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
      K33 International Law


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