Name File Type Size Last Modified
  Johnson_Rehavi_Files 10/13/2019 03:24:AM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 11:24:PM

Project Citation: 

Johnson, Erin M., and Rehavi, M. Marit. Replication data for: Physicians Treating Physicians: Information and Incentives in Childbirth. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114608V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary This paper provides new evidence on the interaction between patient information and physician financial incentives. Using rich microdata on childbirth, we compare the treatment of physicians when they are patients with that of comparable nonphysicians. We also exploit the presence of HMO-owned hospitals to determine how the treatment gap varies with providers' financial incentives. Consistent with induced demand, physicians are approximately 10 percent less likely to receive a C-section, with only a quarter of this effect attributable to differential sorting. While financial incentives affect the treatment of nonphysicians, physician-patients are largely unaffected. Physicians also have better health outcomes. (JEL D83, I11, J16, J44)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
      J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.