Replication data for: Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) David J. Cooper; Kai-Uwe Kühn

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data			10/12/2019 11:42:PM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/12/2019 07:42:PM

Project Description

Summary: We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms: [collusion, renegotiation, communication, cooperation]

JEL Classification:
      C71 Cooperative Games
      C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
      L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

Universe: Experimental subjects were undergraduates students at CWRU.

Data Type(s): experimental data

Methodology

Data Source: Data from experimental sessions.

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

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