Replication data for: Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jeremy T. Fox; Patrick Bajari
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Fox, Jeremy T., and Bajari, Patrick. Replication data for: Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114402V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game approach to estimation. We find that a system of four large regional licenses would raise the allocative efficiency of the C block outcome by 48 percent. (JEL D44, D45, H82, L82)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D44 Auctions
D45 Rationing; Licensing
H82 Governmental Property
L82 Entertainment; Media
D44 Auctions
D45 Rationing; Licensing
H82 Governmental Property
L82 Entertainment; Media
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