Name File Type Size Last Modified
README.pdf application/pdf 27.4 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
comp_ann.dta application/octet-stream 175.1 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
comp_ann_analysis.do text/plain 1.4 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
comp_ann_variables.txt text/plain 1.3 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
human_ann.dta application/octet-stream 30.8 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
human_ann_analysis.do text/plain 4.4 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
human_ann_variables.txt text/plain 854 bytes 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
treatment1.ztt application/octet-stream 44.1 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
treatment2.ztt application/octet-stream 40.2 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM
treatment3.ztt application/octet-stream 44.1 KB 10/12/2019 07:21:PM

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We consider a game where one player, the Announcer, has to communicate the value of a payoff relevant state of the world to a set of players who play a coordination game with multiple equilibria. While the Announcer and the players agree that coordination is desirable, since the payoffs of the players at the equilibria are unequal, they disagree as to which equilibrium is best. We demonstrate experimentally that in such coordination games, in order to mask the asymmetry of equilibrium payoffs, it may be advantageous for a utilitarian benevolent Announcer to communicate in an ambiguous or vague manner. (JEL C71, D81, D83)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C71 Cooperative Games
      D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
      D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) experimental data


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