Replication data for: Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations?

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Project Citation:

Roberts, James W. Replication data for: Can Warranties Substitute for Reputations? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114386V1

Project Description

Summary: In markets where product quality is imperfectly observed or delivery is uncertain, seller reputations and product guarantees or warranties can impact equilibrium prices and quantities. Using data from a decentralized online market, this paper empirically investigates the substitutability of product guarantees for seller reputation. I find that a "guaranteed or your money back" promise from the market maker does not substitute for reputation, either in determining price or the probability of sale. The most likely causes of the policy's ineffectiveness are delays in buyer response to the guarantee and skepticism about reimbursement in the event of fraud. (JEL D82, L14, L15, L81, M31)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      L14 Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
      L15 Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
      L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
      M31 Marketing

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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