Replication data for: An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Christoph Brunner; Jacob K. Goeree; Charles A. Holt; John O. Ledyard
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Brunner, Christoph, Goeree, Jacob K., Holt, Charles A., and Ledyard, John O. Replication data for: An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2010. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114373V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper reports laboratory experiments that evaluate the performance
of a flexible package bidding format developed by the FCC,
in comparison with other combinatorial formats. In general, the
interest of policy makers in combinatorial auctions is justified by the
laboratory data. When value complementarities are present, package
bidding yields improved performance. We find clear differences
among the combinatorial auction formats both in terms of efficiency
and seller revenue, however. Notably, the combinatorial clock provides
the highest revenue. The FCC's flexible package bidding format
performed worse than the alternatives, which is one of the main
reasons why it was not implemented. (JEL D44, H82)
Scope of Project
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