Replication data for: How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Sebastian Fehrler; Niall Hughes
Version: View help for Version V1
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data_for_replication | 10/25/2021 03:32:PM | ||
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 06:49:PM |
Project Citation:
Fehrler, Sebastian, and Hughes, Niall. Replication data for: How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114353V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out—transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Laboratory Experiment;
Group Decision-Making
JEL Classification:
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C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Geographic Coverage:
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Switzerland
Time Period(s):
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5/8/2013 – 5/30/2013
Universe:
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Students form ETH Zurich and University of Zurich who are interested in participating in laboratory experiments (suject pool of DeSciL).
Data Type(s):
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experimental data
Methodology
Unit(s) of Observation:
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Individual Student,
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