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Project Citation: 

Mian, Atif, Sufi, Amir, and Trebbi, Francesco. Replication data for: Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Countries become more politically polarized and fractionalized following financial crises, reducing the likelihood of major financial reforms precisely when they might have especially large benefits. The evidence from a large sample of countries provides strong support for the hypotheses that following a financial crisis, voters become more ideologically extreme and ruling coalitions become weaker, independently of whether they were initially in power. The evidence that increased polarization and weaker governments reduce the chances of financial reform and that financial crises lead to legislative gridlock and anemic reform is less clear-cut. The US debt overhang resolution is discussed as an illustration.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles
      E44 Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
      G01 Financial Crises
      H63 National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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