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Project Citation: 

Brinkman, Jeffrey, Coen-Pirani, Daniele, and Sieg, Holger. Replication data for: The Political Economy of Municipal Pension Funding. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114150V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Many US municipalities have committed to pay retirement benefits to public sector employees but have not saved enough to fulfill these obligations. This paper studies the determinants of municipal pension funding and its implications for intergenerational redistribution using an overlapping generations model. Under perfect capital markets, pension funding choices are fully capitalized into land prices. This neutrality result fails if agents face a binding downpayment constraint in the land market: old agents prefer a pay-as-you-go system, while young agents find a fully funded system optimal. Empirical evidence based on cross-city comparisons of pension liabilities is consistent with these predictions.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures
      H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
      J32 Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
      J45 Public Sector Labor Markets


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