Replication data for: Asymmetric Information between Employers
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Lisa B. Kahn
Version: View help for Version V1
Project Citation:
Kahn, Lisa B. Replication data for: Asymmetric Information between Employers. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113866V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This study explores whether potential employers have the same
information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a
model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case
and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions
in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I
test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My
estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average
expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction
made by incumbent firms.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
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