Replication data for: Asymmetric Information between Employers

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Project Citation:

Kahn, Lisa B. Replication data for: Asymmetric Information between Employers. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113866V1

Project Description

Summary: This study explores whether potential employers have the same information about worker ability as the incumbent firm. I develop a model of asymmetric learning that nests the symmetric learning case and allows the degree of asymmetry to vary. I then show how predictions in the model can be tested with compensation data. Using the NLSY, I test the model and find strong support for asymmetric information. My estimates imply that in one period, outside firms reduce the average expectation error over worker ability by only a third of the reduction made by incumbent firms.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
      J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
      M12 Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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