Replication data for: Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda

Summary:  View help for Summary I study the role of financial incentives as signals of job characteristics when these are unknown to potential applicants. To this end, I create experimental variation in expected earnings and use that to estimate the effect of financial incentives on candidates' perception of a brand-new health-promoter position in Uganda and on the resulting size and composition of the applicant pool. I find that more lucrative positions are perceived as entailing a lower positive externality for the community and discourage agents with strong pro-social preferences from applying. While higher financial incentives attract more applicants and increase the probability of filling a vacancy, the signal they convey reduces the ability to recruit the most socially motivated agents, who are found to stay longer on the job and to perform better.

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
      J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
      J63 Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
      M52 Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
      O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration