Replication data for: Do Fiscal Rules Matter?

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Veronica Grembi; Tommaso Nannicini; Ugo Troiano

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
APP2015-0076_data			10/12/2019 01:05:PM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/12/2019 09:05:AM

Project Citation:

Grembi, Veronica, Nannicini, Tommaso, and Troiano, Ugo. Replication data for: Do Fiscal Rules Matter? Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2016. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113637V1

Project Description

Summary: Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      E62 Fiscal Policy
      H71 State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
      H72 State and Local Budget and Expenditures
      H74 State and Local Borrowing
      R51 Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

Related Publications

Download this project

Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

Export Metadata

Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.