Name File Type Size Last Modified
  Analysis 10/12/2019 12:53:PM
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 08:53:AM

Project Citation: 

Carrillo, Paul, Pomeranz, Dina, and Singhal, Monica. Replication data for: Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113625V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Reducing tax evasion is a priority for many governments. A growing literature argues that verifying taxpayer reports against third-party information is critical for tax collection. However, effectiveness can be limited when tax authorities face constraints to credible enforcement and taxpayers make offsetting adjustments on other margins. We exploit a policy intervention in which Ecuadorian firms were notified about detected revenue discrepancies. Most firms simply failed to respond. Firms that responded increased reported revenue, matching the discrepancy amount when provided. However, they also increased reported costs by 96 cents per dollar of revenue adjustment, resulting in minor increases in tax collection.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
      H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
      H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
      O23 Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development


Related Publications

Published Versions

Export Metadata

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.