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Project Citation: 

Abdulkadroglu, Atila, Angrist, Joshua D., Narita, Yusuke, Pathak, Parag A., and Zarate, Roman A. Replication data for: Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago’s Exam Schools. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Many school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D44 Auctions
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I21 Analysis of Education

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