Replication data for: Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Manuela Angelucci; Daniel Bennett

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Project Citation:

Angelucci, Manuela, and Bennett, Daniel. Replication data for: Assortative Matching under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Malawi. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113510V1

Project Description

Summary: Asymmetric information is a key feature of the marriage market. In HIV-endemic settings, HIV risk is an important partner attribute that may influence marriage timing and partner selection. We use a sample of married women in rural Malawi to validate a model of positive assortative matching under asymmetric information. Several correlations support this framework, suggesting that HIV risk contributes to adverse selection in the marriage market in this setting.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I12 Health Behavior
      J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
      O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-12]

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