Replication data for: Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Jean-Marie Baland; James A. Robinson
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Baland, Jean-Marie, and Robinson, James A. Replication data for: Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2008. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113266V1
Project Description
Summary:
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Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the
political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the
threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such
as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the
introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the
reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to
exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated
with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across
localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
N46 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Latin America; Caribbean
O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
N46 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Latin America; Caribbean
O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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