Replication data for: Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide-and-Seek" Games
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Vincent P. Crawford; Nagore Iriberri
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Crawford, Vincent P., and Iriberri, Nagore. Replication data for: Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naïveté, and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide-and-Seek” Games. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113223V1
Project Description
Summary:
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"Hide-and-seek" games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins
by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such
games are often played on cultural or geographic "landscapes" that frame decisions
nonneutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the
results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model
nonneutral landscapes, in which subjects deviate systematically from equilibrium
in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and econometrically
suggests that the deviations are well explained by a structural nonequilibrium
model of initial responses based on "level-k" thinking, suitably adapted to
nonneutral landscapes. (JEL C72, C92)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
C72 Noncooperative Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
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