Replication data for: Theft, Gift-Giving, and Trustworthiness: Honesty Is Its Own Reward in Rural Paraguay
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Laura Schechter
Version: View help for Version V1
Name | File Type | Size | Last Modified |
---|---|---|---|
|
text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
application/octet-stream | 7.8 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 725 bytes | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
application/pdf | 26.4 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 1.7 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 1.3 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 158 bytes | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 612 bytes | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 1.1 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
|
text/plain | 1.6 KB | 10/12/2019 03:59:AM |
- Total of 16 records. Records per page
- « previous Page of 2
- next »
Project Citation:
Schechter, Laura. Replication data for: Theft, Gift-Giving, and Trustworthiness: Honesty Is Its Own Reward in Rural Paraguay. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2007. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113219V1
Project Description
Summary:
View help for Summary
In developing countries lacking legal enforcement, villagers may use implicit contracts
to minimize crime. I construct a dynamic limited-commitment model, in which
a thief cannot commit to forego stealing, but is induced to steal less by the promise of
future gifts. Combining survey data on production, theft, gifts, and trust with experiments
measuring trustworthiness, I provide supporting evidence. Farmers living near
more relatives or with plots that are difficult to steal from give fewer gifts and trust
more, and those living near more relatives also experience less theft. Giving increases
when trust is lower and the threat of theft is greater. (JEL D86, K42, O17, Z13)
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
View help for Subject Terms
trustworthiness;
gift-giving;
theft
JEL Classification:
View help for JEL Classification
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Geographic Coverage:
View help for Geographic Coverage
Paraguay
Time Period(s):
View help for Time Period(s)
9/2/2002 – 11/23/2002
Universe:
View help for Universe
A random sample of rural households in 16 villages across three departments in Paraguay
Data Type(s):
View help for Data Type(s)
survey data;
experimental data
Methodology
Unit(s) of Observation:
View help for Unit(s) of Observation
household,
Related Publications
Published Versions
Report a Problem
Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.
This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.