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Name File Type Size Last Modified
LICENSE.txt text/plain 14.6 KB 10/12/2019 03:29:AM
Readme.pdf application/pdf 241.1 KB 10/12/2019 03:29:AM
analysis.dta application/octet-stream 1.2 MB 10/12/2019 03:29:AM
figures.do text/x-diff 4 KB 10/12/2019 03:29:AM
tables.do text/x-diff 8 KB 10/12/2019 03:29:AM

Project Citation: 

Xu, Guo. Replication data for: The Costs of Patronage: Evidence from the British Empire. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2018. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113197V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary I combine newly digitized personnel and public finance data from the British colonial administration for the period 1854-1966 to study how patronage affects the promotion and incentives of governors. Governors are more likely to be promoted to higher salaried colonies when connected to their superior during the period of patronage. Once allocated, they provide more tax exemptions, raise less revenue, and invest less. The promotion and performance gaps disappear after the abolition of patronage appointments. Patronage therefore distorts the allocation of public sector positions and reduces the incentives of favored bureaucrats to perform.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
      F54 Colonialism; Imperialism; Postcolonialism
      H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
      J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
      M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
      N43 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: Pre-1913
      N44 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: Europe: 1913-


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