Replication data for: Clientelism in Indian Villages

Summary:  View help for Summary We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
      I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
      J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
      O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
      O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
      O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure