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Project Citation: 

Ashraf, Nava, Field, Erica, and Lee, Jean. Replication data for: Household Bargaining and Excess Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2014. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11.

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We posit that household decision-making over fertility is characterized by moral hazard since most contraception can only be perfectly observed by the woman. Using an experiment in Zambia that varied whether women were given access to contraceptives alone or with their husbands, we find that women given access with their husbands were 19 percent less likely to seek family planning services, 25 percent less likely to use concealable contraception, and 27 percent more likely to give birth. However, women given access to contraception alone report a lower subjective well-being, suggesting a psycho-social cost of making contraceptives more concealable.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I31 General Welfare; Well-Being
      J13 Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
      J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
      O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration

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