Replication data for: Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Benjamin R. Handel
Version: View help for Version V1
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text/plain | 14.6 KB | 10/11/2019 03:17:PM |
Project Citation:
Handel, Benjamin R. Replication data for: Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2013. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112680V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets,
where adverse selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major
change to insurance provision that occurred at a large firm to
identify substantial inertia, and develop and estimate a choice model
that also quantifies risk preferences and ex ante health risk. We use
these estimates to study the impact of policies that nudge consumers
toward better decisions by reducing inertia. When aggregated,
these improved individual-level choices substantially exacerbate
adverse selection in our setting, leading to an overall reduction in
welfare that doubles the existing welfare loss from adverse selection.
Scope of Project
Subject Terms:
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Adverse Selection;
Inertia;
Health Insurance
JEL Classification:
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D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
Time Period(s):
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Data Type(s):
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other:;
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