Replication data for: Public Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Evidence from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board's Entry Decisions

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Katja Seim; Joel Waldfogel

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
driving-distance-km			10/11/2019 06:24:PM
driving-time-min			10/11/2019 06:24:PM
straight-line-distance-km			10/11/2019 06:24:PM

Project Description

Summary: We estimate a spatial model of liquor demand to analyze the impact of government-controlled retailing on entry patterns. In the absence of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, the state would have roughly 2.5 times the current number of stores, higher consumer surplus, and lower payments to liquor store employees. With just over half the number of stores that would maximize welfare, the government system is instead best rationalized as profit maximization with profit sharing. Government operation mitigates, but does not eliminate, free entry's bias against rural consumers. We find only limited evidence of political influence on entry. (JEL D42, D72, L11, L12, L43, L81)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D42 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
      D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
      L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
      L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
      L43 Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
      L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

Related Publications

Download this project

Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-11]

Export Metadata

Dublin Core

DDI 2.5

Report a Problem

Found a serious problem with the data, such as disclosure risk or copyrighted content? Let us know.

This material is distributed exactly as it arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.