Replication data for: Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Drew Fudenberg; David G. Rand; Anna Dreber
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Fudenberg, Drew, Rand, David G., and Dreber, Anna. Replication data for: Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112512V1
Project Description
Summary:
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We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all
settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were "lenient" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were "forgiving" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
C72 Noncooperative Games
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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