Replication data for: Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Petra Moser; Alessandra Voena

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
compulsory_licensing_replication			10/11/2019 04:41:PM
LICENSE.txt	text/plain	14.6 KB	10/11/2019 12:41:PM

Project Citation:

Moser, Petra, and Voena, Alessandra. Replication data for: Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2012. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112497V1

Project Description

Summary: Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 130,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by 20 percent. (JEL D45, L24, N42, O31, O34)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      D45 Rationing; Licensing
      L24 Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
      N42 Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: 1913-
      O31 Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
      O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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V1 [2019-10-11]

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