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Empirics.do text/plain 19.4 KB 10/11/2019 11:52:AM
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ebaydatafinal.dta application/octet-stream 275.4 MB 10/11/2019 11:52:AM
readme.txt text/plain 3.2 KB 10/11/2019 11:52:AM

Project Citation: 

Lewis, Gregory. Replication data for: Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112439V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. This defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices. (JEL D44, D82, L81)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D44 Auctions
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      L81 Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce


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