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Project Citation: 

Levitt, Steven D., List, John A., and Sadoff, Sally E. Replication data for: Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2011. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-11. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112418V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games—Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games. (JEL C73)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games


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