Code and Data for: Bargaining under the Shadow of Uncertainty

Principal Investigator(s):  View help for Principal Investigator(s) Marina Agranov, Caltech; Hulya Eraslan, Rice University; Chloe Tergiman, Penn State University

Version:  View help for Version V1

Name File Type Size Last Modified
ReadmeNew.pdf application/pdf 89 KB 02/16/2024 07:32:AM
Replication.do text/plain 28.8 KB 02/13/2024 07:19:AM
chatdata_48and96.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 402.6 KB 04/12/2019 01:03:PM
data.2019.04.12.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 363.2 KB 02/13/2024 07:18:AM
figures.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 27.5 KB 06/30/2023 06:09:AM
majorityChats.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 70.1 KB 05/06/2021 03:44:PM
preparebargaining.do text/plain 8.2 KB 02/16/2024 05:47:AM
preparechat.do text/plain 31.3 KB 08/20/2021 10:10:PM
risk.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 90 KB 04/13/2019 06:18:PM
session1_070212.chatswithmembers.xlsx application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet 49.2 KB 05/06/2021 03:32:PM

Project Citation: 

Agranov, Marina, Eraslan, Hulya, and Tergiman, Chloe. Code and Data for: Bargaining under the Shadow of Uncertainty. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2024. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2024-09-30. https://doi.org/10.3886/E192422V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary
In bargaining environments with stochastic future surplus, failing to delay agreement can be inefficient when the expected future surplus is sufficiently high.
Theoretically, such inefficiencies never arise under unanimity rule but can under majority rule.
Using a laboratory experiment, we find support for these predictions, both when the unanimity rule is predicted to be more efficient and when there should be no difference between the two rules.
We also find large point prediction deviations under the majority rule. 
We show these deviations can be explained by higher-than-predicted egalitarian sharing and a lower risk of being excluded from future agreements.

Scope of Project

Subject Terms:  View help for Subject Terms bargaining
JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
      C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
      D70 Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General


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V1 [2024-09-30]

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