Replication data for: Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948

Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ricard Gil

Name	File Type	Size	Last Modified
Final_do_file.do	text/plain	12.7 KB	10/12/2019 10:21:PM
ReadMe.pdf	application/pdf	30.5 KB	10/12/2019 10:21:PM
data_2012_0245.dta	application/octet-stream	11.3 MB	10/12/2019 10:21:PM

Project Description

Summary: I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:
      G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
      K21 Antitrust Law
      L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
      L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure
      L42 Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
      L82 Entertainment; Media

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Published Versions

V1 [2019-10-13]

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