Replication data for: Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Ricard Gil
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Gil, Ricard. Replication data for: Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2015. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-13. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114556V1
Project Description
Summary:
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I empirically examine the impact of the 1948 Paramount antitrust case on ticket prices using a unique dataset collected from Variety magazine issues between 1945 and 1955. With information on prices, revenues, and theater ownership for an unbalanced panel of 393 theaters in 26 cities, I find that vertically integrated theaters charged lower prices and sold more admission tickets than nonintegrated theaters. I also find that the rate at which prices increased in theaters was slower while integrated than after vertical divestiture. These findings together with institutional details are consistent with the prediction that vertical integration lowers prices through the elimination of double marginalization. (JEL G34, K21, L11, L22, L42, L82)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
K21 Antitrust Law
L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure
L42 Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L82 Entertainment; Media
G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
K21 Antitrust Law
L11 Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
L22 Firm Organization and Market Structure
L42 Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L82 Entertainment; Media
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