Replication data for: The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Chang-Tai Hsieh; Edward Miguel; Daniel Ortega; Francisco Rodriguez
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Description
Summary:
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In 2004, the Hugo Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of
several million voters who had attempted to remove him from office
throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chávez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chávez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.3 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. (JEL D72, O17)
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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